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Non-research-intensive sectors and firms have played a comparatively subordi-
nate role in the economic and innovation policy debate up to now. Due to the 
strong focus of the political discussion on research-intensive areas, little signifi-
cance has been attributed in the past to the potentials of the non-research-inten-
sive branches and businesses for Germany as an industrial location. The reason 
behind this is that areas with intensive research and development (R&D) have 
significantly higher growth rates and, according to the arguments of the new 
growth theory, are best placed to contribute to the country’s international com-
petitiveness. The present innovation report focuses on non-research-intensive 
sectors and firms and demonstrates which direct and, above all, also indirect 
contributions these branches make towards Germany’s international competi-
tiveness and which future potentials result from this situation.
The role of non-research-intensive sectors and companies has attracted increas-
ing attention in the scientific debate in recent years. It is increasingly well known 
that these areas continue to represent a significant sector of the economy, even 
in developed industrialized nations and play an important role for the respective 
national economy and the innovation system. There is still relatively little in-
formation about what these sectors actually contribute. Equally, relatively little 
is known about the competitive and innovation strategies of non-research-in-
tensive firms. Although it is known that these firms scarcely conduct formal 
research and development and thus rarely pursue a classical, R&D-based in-
novation strategy, up to now there has only been sporadic evidence of which 
alternative strategies they choose in order to succeed in their own, in part highly 
competitive markets. Obviously, there are other ways and means, besides an 
explicit research orientation, for firms to be competitive without conducting in-
house R&D.
The innovation report is divided into three main parts. In the first section the 
focus is on the economic relevance of non-research-intensive branches. Based 
on potential analyses, we show the direct and indirect spill-over effects non-re-
search-intensive branches have on growth and employment in German industry 
as a whole. By contrast, the second section concentrates on the company level 
and investigates which competitive and innovation strategies non-research-in-
tensive firms in German industry utilize to achieve long-term success with their 
products against stiff competition. One emphasis is placed on the skills and 
qualification needs of these businesses, among others. The third section provides 
a synthesis of both investigative perspectives. It summarizes the insights gained 
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at the macroeconomic and individual company level into an overall picture and 
on this basis derives options for policy/political action.
In processing these research issues the report is backed up by extensive empirical 
data, both at branch and also enterprise level. The study of the overall economic 
significance of the non-research-intensive industries is based on official statistical 
data at the national and international level and includes, besides macroeconom-
ic variables like production, value added, export and employment, in addition 
indicators of the innovation process (e. g. R&D, patent and other innovation 
activities). The analyses at the microeconomic level are primarily based on data 
from a telephone survey of more than 200 non-research-intensive enterprises, 
as well as 88 particularly research-intensive companies, which for the first time 
provided information in this form on topics like market environment, compet-
itive strategy, available competence/skills, ability to absorb and implement ex-
ternal information, protection and meaning of different forms of knowledge or 
future opportunities and risks. German data from the European Manufacturing 
Survey 2009 conducted by Fraunhofer ISI are referred to for complementary 
evaluations of certain issues at the company level.
IMPORTANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO VALUE ADDED
In Germany, as the result of structural change, the macroeconomic share of value 
added of manufacturing industry as a whole and of the non-research-intensive 
industrial sectors in particular has sunk continuously since 1970. Nevertheless, 
these still contribute around 41% to industrial value added (This means value 
creation of manufacturing industry). This share even amounts to 73% in the 
EU-14 average, and can be explained by the fact that, in Germany, so-called 
»sophisticated consumer technology« (for example, mechanical engineering and 
automobile construction) plays an especially large role, compared with other 
countries. The USA and Japan also record a higher value added share of the 
non-research-intensive sectors compared with Germany. Despite the steadily 
increasing importance of the service sector for the value added of the econo-
my as a whole, in all industrialized countries, non-research-intensive sectors in 
manufacturing industry continue to provide an essential share in industrial val-
ue creation. Interesting, too, is the dynamics of non-research-intensive sectors 
over the course of time. Contrary to the assumption that sectors change their 
R&D-intensity over time, analyses of available OECD data between 1975 and 
2006 were unable to provide evidence of great changes in the average R&D-in-
tensity of sectors. There are neither sectors which have developed from non-re-
search-intensive to research-intensive in this time period, nor sectors which have 
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transformed themselves from formerly research-intensive to non-research-inten-
sive sectors as a result of technology life cycles. Non-research-intensive sectors 
remain structurally stable over several decades and can obviously survive in the 
market even without raising their R&D-intensity.
Non-research-intensive sectors are however not synonymous with the group of 
non-research-intensive businesses. The branch or firm level represents two dis-
tinct levels of observation. All industrial branches are composed of a colorful 
mix of firms with varying degrees of research intensity. Admittedly, the share 
of non-research-intensive firms per branch varies, but these firms are found to 
varying degrees in every branch of manufacturing industry.
MARKET ENVIRONMENT AND COMPETETIVE STRATEGIES
The market environment for non-research-intensive companies is more difficult 
than for research-intensive firms, as they are much more frequently active in 
largely saturated or even shrinking markets. In addition, their products can gen-
erally be more easily substituted than products from research-intensive firms, 
presumably due to their generally lower product complexity. In order to re-
main competitive despite these difficult framework conditions, non-research-in-
tensive firms must survive cut-throat competition and convince their clients by 
performing better than their competitors. This is achieved by prioritizing the 
orientation towards very high quality, adapting the products to specific cus-
tomer requirements and short delivery times which are also facilitated by the 
close spatial proximity to customers. The product price plays a comparatively 
subordinate role as a priority competitive factor. Although costs are certainly 
an important factor, non-research-intensive companies in Germany still do not 
compete pre-dominantly via the price of their products and services. They are 
better or quicker, but not necessarily cheaper, than their rivals. In this way, they 
occupy a niche which can be quite attractive to firms in a developed high-wage 
country such as Germany: producing high quality and delivering customer-spe-
cific products of low research intensity at top-bracket prices – at least to some 
extent. Examples for such successful niches with growth potential include tech-
nical and functional textiles, sustainable and high-quality foods or lightweight 
and low-wear metal and plastic parts, among others.
Companies in non-research-intensive sectors are domestically oriented to a 
strong degree. They buy their primary products from mainly domestic sources 
and are therefore less dependent on imports. At the same time, they have lower 
direct exports when compared with research-intensive sectors, although they 
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contribute substantially to German exports indirectly through their connections 
to suppliers and buyers. Moreover, non-research-intensive industries have re-
corded the comparatively highest increases in foreign sales turnover over the last 
few years. Additionally, on a company level, it is apparent that non-research-in-
tensive enterprises in the industrial value chain are equally split between final 
product manufacturers and suppliers. Companies from the traditionally strong 
German export sectors of mechanical engineering and automotive industry form 
part of the customer group of non-research-intensive suppliers. Consequently, 
non-research-intensive firms make an important indirect contribution on the 
customer side to Germany’s export strength via the supply of high quality and 
internationally competitive primary products. However, non-research-intensive 
companies usually only have production facilities in Germany and have hardly 
any foreign investments. The majority of their most important markets, custom-
ers, suppliers and competitors are also located in Germany. This strong domestic 
alignment, which is characterized, on the one hand, by intensive interrelations 
with companies from other sectors, and by mainly national customer structures, 
on the other, can also result in non-research-intensive companies not being as 
directly dependent on globally-induced short- and medium-term demand fluctu-
ations to the same extent as firms which are strongly oriented towards exports.
EMPLOYMENT AND QUALIFICATION
Non-research-intensive sectors employ around half the industrial employees or 
11% of all employees in Germany. Since these sectors are more labor-inten-
sive on average than research-intensive branches, additional demand effects also 
trigger a higher direct effect on employment. However, these branches not only 
make an essential direct contribution to employment in Germany, but also an 
indirect one. They are interrelated with upstream suppliers in such a way that 
additional jobs are created there as well, if there is a growth in demand. To a 
considerable extent, indeed approx. 45%, of these indirect employment effects 
are caused in service sectors.
Non-research-intensive sectors do indeed employ a much lower share of academ-
ics compared with research-intensive branches, but these sectors are indirectly 
responsible for the creation of knowledge-intensive jobs in their supplier sectors. 
The indirect effect on academic positions (among them also substantial numbers 
of jobs for female academics) emanating from non-research-intensive sectors, 
is higher than the indirect effect triggered by research-intensive sectors. This is 
probably due to the fact that, to a large extent, these sectors demand machines, 
other capital goods and knowledge-intensive services whose production requires 
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many highly qualified workers at the relevant suppliers. This supposition is also 
corroborated by findings in the company survey conducted which show that 
many non-research-intensive companies invest heavily in process technology 
and at least to some extent shop externally for innovative technology solutions.
Non-research-intensive sectors also make a substantial contribution towards 
stabilizing the revenues of social security systems. In these sectors, addition-
al demand impulses directly and indirectly induce positive effects on jobs with 
mandatory social security contributions. These effects are larger than the corre-
sponding effects of research-intensive sectors.
In addition, it can be stated that non-research-intensive companies offer signifi-
cant job creation potential for semi-skilled and unskilled workers. They employ 
almost twice as many low-skilled workers – one third of the workforce than par-
ticularly research-intensive firms. At the same time, they do not use temporary 
workers more frequently than other companies; the average share of temporary 
positions in the workforce is 7% which is almost exactly the same as the share 
in especially research-intensive firms. This result is actually quite remarkable, 
since it could be assumed that non-research-intensive companies in particular, 
whose production structures are characterized by higher labor intensity and the 
tendency towards simpler tasks, would use temporary workers more for flexible 
utilization of their production.
INNOVATION, KNOWLEDGE AND ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
Non-research-intensive sectors have by definition low expenditures for R&D, 
however, they indirectly trigger additional R&D activities in their suppliers. 
A considerable portion of the R&D activities involved in the production of their 
competitive products are undertaken in the more research-intensive supplier 
branches. In this manner, non-research-intensive branches contribute by means 
of their R&D spill-over effects, similar to the situation with jobs for academics, 
mainly indirectly towards strengthening Germany as a research and develop-
ment location.
Compared with research-intensive branches, non-research-intensive branches 
have on average not only lower R&D expenditures, but also lower expenditures 
for innovation as a whole. However, there are significant differences between 
individual non-research-intensive sectors. Innovation expenditures include, be-
sides pure R&D outlays, among other items also investments in fixed assets, 
investments in training, expenses for patenting and licenses as well as market-
6
SUMMARY
ing expenditures for innovations. Non-research-intensive branches invest in part 
considerable sums on innovation in these fields, whereby these expenditures 
outside of formal R&D are accorded great significance in these sectors. The 
analyses at company level have confirmed: investments in machines and plants 
(process innovations) and sales/marketing (opening up new markets) play an im-
portant role for non-research-intensive firms. These investments are made either 
to expand the firm’s position in an existing market or to open up new markets 
entirely.
In view of the very low significance of formal research and development in these 
branches and companies, it is at first glance surprising that the majority of the 
patents applied for in Germany are filed in non-research-intensive technology 
fields. Their share has declined slightly, but still ca. 40% of the total number of 
patent applications are filed in non-research-intensive technology areas. This is 
however not a uniquely German phenomenon. In other industrialized countries 
these »non-research-intensive patents« also continue to constitute a considera-
ble share of the total patent applications.
On the other hand, the company survey clearly illustrated that non-research-in-
tensive firms (at about 40%) apply for patents significantly less often than par-
ticularly research-intensive firms (over 70%) in order to secure their competitive 
edge/knowledge advantage. An explanation for this apparent contradiction lies 
among other things in the fact that research-intensive companies also apply for 
patents in non-research-intensive technology fields. One example for this is an 
automobile concern (research-intensive enterprise), which applies for patents 
in the area of metal forming (non-research-intensive technology field). Against 
this background, it must be said that the technology-field-related patent analy-
sis to assess the patenting propensity of certain corporate groups (e. g. non-re-
search-intensive firms) is only of limited use.
Innovation plays a significant role also for non-research-intensive firms. Inter-
esting in this context is that the most important innovation goals of non-re-
search-intensive firms are more frequently found in the areas of process inno-
vation and service innovation than is the case for research-intensive companies. 
Although product innovation plays the main role for almost half of the non-re-
search-intensive firms investigated, it is still less often the primary innovation 
goal than in research-intensive companies. The relatively high prioritization of 
process innovations also contributes towards the non-research-intensive firms 
largely being on a par with research-intensive companies in utilizing innovative 
process technology. They are very capable of successfully applying innovative 
process technologies in their enterprises.
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In the context of product innovations, it is remarkable that more than one third 
of the non-research-intensive firms state that they want to increase their market 
share primarily through new products. This proves that successful new product 
development can take place in these businesses, despite low direct investments 
in R&D. In addition, over 60% of the non-research-intensive firms rely on a 
»first mover« or pioneer strategy to protect their competition-relevant knowl-
edge. Compared with especially research-intensive firms, this share is smaller, 
but the majority appears to be in a position to at least partially recognize the 
needs of the market at an early stage and offer market-oriented, technical or 
process innovations.
The »absorptive capacity« of a business describes its ability to perceive sugges-
tions and insights from the outside world, to evaluate and implement them in 
the firm and exploit them to improve the competitive position. The analyses of 
firms’ absorptive capacity prove impressively that this is not in the least corre-
lated with their research and development intensity. This applies not only to the 
technological, but also the customer-related absorptive capacity. If technological 
developments are of great relevance for the competitiveness of the respective 
company, then non-research-intensive firms are definitely capable of develop-
ing a similar or even superior technological absorptive capacity as especially 
re-search-intensive companies.
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
Non-research-intensive enterprises had, like all businesses in Germany, to cope 
with a substantial decline in sales due to the financial crisis. More than half of 
them suffered declining sales figures as expected in the crisis year of 2009. Nev-
ertheless, the businesses surveyed did not consider this development to be life 
threatening. With the exception of single companies, those interviewed estimat-
ed the losses suffered as manageable, a quarter even as largely unproblematic. 
Thus one cannot speak of a particular threat to non-research-intensive firms by 
external shocks like the most recent global economic crisis. Nearly a quarter 
of the respondents were able to notch up a rising sales trend, despite the finan-
cial crisis. Interestingly, especially research-intensive and non-research-intensive 
firms assess the impacts of the economic crisis very similarly, though possibly for 
different reasons.
Non-research-intensive firms see the greatest opportunities for future growth in 
the coming five years in the exploitation of new (sales) markets, in particular 
foreign target markets, as well as in more intensive handling of existing mar-
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ket segments. The increasing competition via the product price, especially from 
competitors from abroad, is named as a significant risk factor. This shows in 
part the vulnerability of the present competitive position of German non-re-
search-intensive firms, which are strongly focused on domestic markets. Non-re-
search-intensive businesses see good opportunities in developing the innovation 
aspect, albeit less frequently than particularly research-intensive firms. Non-re-
search-intensive firms explicitly mention product innovations, new technologies 
and process innovations, in order to be able to defend or expand their compet-
itive position in the long term. On the whole, innovations appear to play a key 
role for the future competitiveness of these firms, also and because of the condi-
tion of low R&D. It cannot be assumed per se that these firms possess a lower 
propensity to innovate.
Risks for future business success were strongly affected by the current economic 
situation and the resulting impacts of declining demand and limited resources 
for investment, both from the customer side as well as from the own side. Up 
to now, however, as the analysis of the sales trend in the non-research-intensive 
companies in the surveyed period showed, they managed to weather the effects 
of the economic crisis despite this critical assessment pretty well. In this context, 
the stricter lending regulations as a result of the crisis remain a critical issue, 
which could also have negative consequences for investment projects and for the 
pre-financing of customer orders.
OPTIONS FOR ACTION
From the findings presented, various policy options can be derived. It should be 
noted on principle that demarcating non-research-intensive sectors versus sec-
tors of higher quality consumer or cutting-edge technology merely serves to ana-
lyze a more or less reliable population of various research-intensive enterprises 
in a statistically limitable manner. In reality, however, there are no cutting-edge 
technology sectors, but only cutting-edge technology enterprises, and they turn 
up again in relevant shares also in non-research-intensive sectors.
Measures and programs in economic, innovation and technology policy which 
are limited to high-tech sectors would thus completely disregard essential pillars 
of the Germany economic system. Against this background, it must be empha-
sized that the »High-tech Strategy« (HTS) of the federal government, in par-
ticular, is not exclusively focused on enterprises allegedly from the leading-edge 
technology sectors, but also offers appropriate incentives and instruments for 
the technologically and competitively well set-up enterprises from the less re-
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search-intensive sectors to also participate. A balanced consideration of both 
areas, taking the complementarities and respective strengths into considera-
tion, could promise higher stimulating potentials to strengthen the innovative 
capacity and competitiveness of the German economy. Opportunities to par-
ticipate exist already, but should be communicated more actively, as alone the 
name »High-tech Strategy« might suggest a concentration on research-intensive 
branches. Even through the further development of the High-tech Strategy (HTS 
2) with its focus on the areas of need arising from the global challenges climate/
energy, health/nutrition, mobility, security and communication, in which Ger-
many would like to become a pioneer with the aid of significant problem-solving 
contributions based on key technologies, this possible misinterpretation has not 
been eradicated. More explicit information about the possibilities for firms from 
the non-research-intensive sectors to take advantage of the existing offers would 
be a help here.
In economic policy terms, the strong domestic orientation of non-research-in-
tensive industrial areas offers the chance, when deploying measures to stimulate 
the economy, to achieve higher domestic value added and employment effects 
in these firms than by solely stimulating more research-intensive sectors. Due to 
the high labor intensity of these sectors, additional demand could also trigger 
increased direct employment effects, which would mean jobs created primarily 
in Germany because of the predominantly domestically oriented enterprise and 
location structures. In addition, due to the intensive linkages with up-stream, of-
ten research-intensive equipment suppliers significant employment effects could 
also be indirectly generated, which due to the strong domestic orientation of 
upstream procurement of intermediate and primary goods will also mainly take 
place in Germany.
The findings presented have manifold implications for innovation and technolo-
gy policy. Basically, it must be remembered that isolated consideration of the sig-
nificance of research-intensive and non-research-intensive sectors for the inno-
vation capacity and competitiveness of German industry clearly does not go far 
enough. Non-research-intensive sectors are closely tied to more research-inten-
sive sectors by intensive linkages, so that their demand in these supplier sectors 
triggers additional research and development activities and thus also provides 
additional jobs in this area. Non-research-intensive firms are not per se cut off 
from technological developments outside their company or their branch. Quite 
the contrary, the absorptive capability of these firms indicates that they are as 
capable as particularly research-intensive firms of perceiving and implementing 
technological developments and benefiting from knowledge and technology dif-
fusion to improve their future competitiveness.
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Based on growth theory considerations, it appears at first logical to make in-
creased efforts to strengthen the innovation capacity and competitiveness of 
non-research-intensive firms, so that they undertake R&D continuously or raise 
their R&D-intensity significantly above the low-tech threshold. This approach 
assumes that non-research-intensive companies in Germany have no real me-
dium- to long-term perspective, which according to the results presented here, 
must at least be questioned.
An approach to be considered in parallel could be to take the identified strengths 
of the non-research-intensive firms as the starting point for innovation poli-
cy measures. This, however, requires an extended view of innovations. Future 
growth potentials cannot be generated only through technical product innova-
tions, but also through technical or organizational process innovations as well 
as service innovations in industry. In these areas, non-research-intensive firms 
with respect to intervening features such as size or product complexity do not 
have quantifiable disadvantages compared with research-intensive companies. 
Against this background, it should be a complementary goal of innovation poli-
cy, industrial associations and enterprises to ensure and expand the strengths of 
non-research-intensive firms in the field of technical and non-technical process 
and service innovations.
A key to this endeavor will be to offer complementary innovation incentives for 
non-research-intensive firms and not merely to stimulate R&D activities. Cru-
cial for technical and non-technical product and process innovations of non-re-
search-intensive firms and also of research-intensive companies are in particular 
internal competences and skills, on the one hand, to market and support the 
»diffusion« of own innovations, on the other hand, for the successful adoption 
of external developments and concepts (»absorptive capacity«). This often re-
quires sufficient innovation expenditures beyond expenditures on R&D, for ex-
ample, on the sales side in the area of developing customer-specific adaptations 
(customization), construction, (service-) design or marketing outlays or from the 
adoption angle, for investments in capital assets of training.
One option for technology and innovation policy would then be to increasingly 
provide broader innovation incentives which also take into account the diffu-
sion and adoption of innovations and the required linkages and interactions of 
non-research-intensive and research-intensive enterprises and sectors. Concrete 
approaches here could be, besides the supply-oriented promotion of technolo-
gies, for example, measures to accelerate diffusion processes on the demand side 
or early integration of non-research-intensive (end) user enterprises in pre-com-
petitive joint projects or to promote the early interaction with research-intensive 
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players in other appropriate platforms or »arenas«. Further measures beyond 
the actual focus of technology and innovation policy could target the design of 
innovation-friendly framework conditions through appropriate concepts in edu-
cational policy, regulation, public procurement and taxation.
In this context, the indicator »R&D expenditures« respectively »R&D-intensi-
ty« as a measure of the innovation and absorptive capacity of companies and 
sectors should be critically questioned. The analyses conducted have clearly 
showed that the R&D-intensity is not demonstrably linked to the technolog-
ical and customer-related absorptive capacity of firms and therefore does not 
seem to be an appropriate indicator for this. In science and research, however, 
R&D-intensity is still frequently utilized as an indicator for a company’s absorp-
tive capacity. However, the explanatory power of the indicator R&D intensity 
for the innovative capacity of a business should be questioned, if one is using 
a holistic understanding of innovation. The ability to develop and implement 
technical and non-technical product, process and service innovations necessi-
tates, as shown above, many and varied competences beyond classical research 
and development. The construct of innovation expenditures could be one suita-
ble approach to developing more appropriate input indicators for a company’s 
innovation capabilities in a holistic sense. Rather more difficult is the task of 
developing suitable output indicators for each innovation field which permit 
cross-branch and cross-sector comparisons. The EU is planning to take on the 
task of »Developing a new Indicator to Measure Innovation« within the frame-
work of its Europe Strategy 2020.
For labor market policy, the presented results are simultaneously a chance and a 
challenge. On the one hand, the non-research-intensive companies in manufac-
turing industry are one of the last segments which offer, comparatively speak-
ing, attractively paid jobs in manufacturing for lowly skilled workers compared, 
for example, with the low-wage sectors in many service areas. Also against 
this background, the preservation and possibly specific support for the non-re-
search-intensive industrial areas in Germany should have a relevant policy pri-
ority. On the other hand, in these areas of industry, the shares of semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers in total employment, as well as total employment on the 
whole, are in decline. This is likely to exacerbate the already existing problems 
of semi-skilled or unskilled workers in the labor market even further. Against 
this background, the question arises, how, in cooperation with labor market 
policy, interest groups, unions and management, to promote relevant concepts 
for the need-oriented further qualification of low skilled workers which take 
the specific needs of non-research-intensive industry as the starting point. Going 
further, this will also have well known implications for the education system. 
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Even non-research-intensive firms see the need for action here, because they are 
increasingly finding less suitable applicants, even for their requirements. The 
widely discussed »shortage of skilled workers« will not spare these branches, 
either today or in the future.
Finally, financial and economic policies are required. To date, the non-research-in-
tensive firms have coped surprisingly well with the impacts of the economic 
crisis. In order to keep it this way, the stricter lending policy resulting from the 
crisis, which could become a bottleneck not only for further investment projects 
to modernize production, but also for pre-financing customers’ orders, should 
preferably not be overdrawn. As many of the non-research-intensive firms are 
planning investments in the next five years, overly restrictive lending should be 
avoided as far as possible, or more attractive alternatives offered if required, in 
order not to nip the bourgeoning growth impulses in these areas prematurely in 
the bud.
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